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1. Introduction 
In current discussions of globalization, focus has 
been placed on the increased freedom of international trade in 
goods and services, as well as greater mobility of financial 
assets. However, recent patterns of globalization have 
exhibited a further phenomenon, viz. the role of advances in 
technology and lowered costs of services in fostering a 
fragmentation of vertically integrated production processes 
into separate segments that may enter international trade. The 
production of automobiles in most countries now makes use of 
components such as tires made by French or Italian producers, 
injection systems produced in Germany, computer chips 
manufactured in Malaysia, with software developed in the 
United States. Plunging international costs of 
telecommunication and developments of FAX and internet 
technology have allowed the production process to be 
widespread on a global basis with much less attention paid to 
national boundaries. 
If the term fragmentation suggests destruction, it is 
creative destruction in the Schumpeterian tradition. Breaking 
down the integrated process into separate stages of production 
opens up new possibilities for exploiting gains from 
specialization. Although such fragmentation is likely to occur 
first on a local or national basis, significant cuts in costs of 
international co-ordination often allow producers to take 
advantage of differences in technologies and factor prices 
among countries in designing more global production 
networks. 
 
A number of authors have investigated various 
aspects of fragmentation, often using their own framework and 
terminology. In a series of articles Sven Arndt (1996, 1997a, 
1997b) has shown how intra-product specialization can be 
trade-enhancing and welfare improving. Richard Harris 
(1993, 1995), on the other hand, concentrated on the role of 
tele-communications in establishing a new production 
paradigm.  Alan Deardorff (1997) has investigated a 
two-country model in order to focus upon the determination of 
international prices in a setting in which production processes 
get fragmented. Gordon Hanson (1996) has illustrated the 
fragmentation phenomenon in the case of Mexico and its 
closer association with production in the United States.
1 Our 
discussion in the present paper builds upon our two earlier 
analyses of international fragmentation (1990, 1998), 
focussing upon the importance of service links in connecting 
fragmented production blocks. 
 
The next section of this paper probes the 
fundamentals of the fragmentation process and how prices 
may adjust in global markets. The key role of services and the 
importance of increasing returns are highlighted in section 3. 
Section 4 explores in more detail possible causes of the 
increased degree of fragmentation now observed in world 
markets. A phenomenon of utmost interest in current policy 
debates is the effect of globalization on the distribution of 
income within a country, especially in the United States. 
Section 5 investigates the connection between fragmentation 
and wage rates for less skilled workers. The final section of 
the paper suggests various further consequences of the 
fragmentation phenomenon, especially as regards the changing 
nature of markets in the global economy. 
 
 
2. Fundamentals of Fragmentation 
 
The term, "fragmentation", refers to a splitting up of 
a previously integrated production process into two or more 
components, or "fragments". As we detail in the next section, 
such fragmentation is made possible by utilizing activities 
from the "service" sector. Here we focus more intensively on a 
simple characterization of the process when fragmentation 
takes place at the international level.  Consider the technology 
exhibited in Figure 1.  For an economy in an initial 
equilibrium, with commodity prices given by world markets 
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Further contributions to the literature are found in 
Cairncross (1997), Borrus and Zysman (1997), Borrus (1997), 
Zysman, Doherty and Schwartz (1996), Davis and Meyer (1998), 
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and factor prices determined by the country's technology, 
endowments, and world commodity prices, suppose that 
internationally-traded commodity I is produced with rigid 
input coefficients of two factors, say capital and labor. Point I 
indicates the factor input bundle required to produce $1 worth 
of this integrated good at the going prices. Assume that 
production requires a combination of two segments. Points a 
and  b illustrate the fixed input requirements for these 
segments, and their vector summation must be reflected in 
point I. In the initial situation the production process and 
conditions of trade do not allow an actual split of I into these 
two parts.  There is no market price for each component, but 
the costs of these segments can be obtained by the presumed 
fixed input/output coefficients and the equilibrium values of 
the wage rate and return to capital. Thus points A and B, lying 
on the line whose slope is given by the initial factor price ratio 
( - w/r), show amounts of capital and labor for each segment 
that would add up exactly to $1.  The appropriate weights for 
A and B in I would then be reflected in their share of costs in 
the integrated activity.  
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With fragmentation it becomes possible to trade 
directly in the separate segments. To simplify, we assume 
away here the explicit costs involved in breaking down a 
vertical link as well as any costs involved in assembling 
components a and b.  If such assembly costs were to be 
considered, there would in effect be a tripartite fragmentation 
of the production process. In the spirit of much of classical 
trade theory, we limit the number of such fragments to two. 
 
It is to be expected that the process of fragmentation 
could involve a disturbance to factor and commodity markets. 
We are particularly interested in the scenario in which the 
separate components can be traded on world markets, so that 
new, now explicit, world prices are determined. As a rough 
first guide it might be thought that world prices for each of the 
segments would fall, a reflection of the greater degree of 
international competition and possibilities for specialization 
according to Ricardian comparative advantage as, in effect, the 
number of tradeable items becomes larger. Assuming that 
physical input/output coefficients remain unaltered, a fal1 in 
the world price of A, compared to its initial imputed value at 
home, would be shown in Figure 1 by a movement of A along 
the ray further from the origin, because it would now take a 
greater quantity of each factor to earn $1 on world markets.  
Of course it might be the case that this country is especially 
good at producing fragment A relative to other countries so 
that, when international fragmentation occurs, the price of  A 
is driven up beyond the imputed price (or cost) of A in this 
country’s pre-trade state.  Whatever the comparison of autarky 
and trade prices for the separate sections, we assume that the 
greater degree of Ricardian specialization reflecting 
comparative advantage in these separate fragments leads to a 
world price for the final commodity that falls short of its price 
before fragmentation.  Thus in Figure 2 a ray from the origin 
through point I would hit the chord connecting the amounts of 
labor and capital required to produce $1 worth of the two 
fragments at the newly established world prices at point Ic, 
lying northeast of I.  The ratio IIc/0I would reveal the 
consequent relative fall in the world price of obtaining a unit 
of the final integrated commodity. 
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The Hicksian composite unit-value Isoquant for this 
country, such as depicted in Figure 2, serves to illustrate the 
possible patterns of production and factor prices before and 
after fragmentation. Given world prices in the initial state for 
commodities 1, 2 and I, and assuming fixed input coefficients 
throughout, suppose the unit-value Isoquant for these three 
commodities are as shown in Figure 2, with the connecting 
chords outlining the original Hicksian composite unit-value IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Isoquant. Thus if the country's endowments are not extreme, it 
will originally be producing commodity I and commodity 1, or 
I and 2. (We do not consider the possibility that the country 
could produce only commodity 1 or commodity 2, with 
resulting losses in employment for capital or for labor). Also 
illustrated are points Ac and Bc, which take into account the 
new world prices for post-fragmentation individual segments 
which can now enter trade. As drawn, for this country it is no 
longer possible to produce fragment Bc. There must be some 
one or more countries, however, whose technology in 
producing  B is sufficiently superior so that for such a country 
point Bc  lies on its Hicksian unit-value composite Isoquant. 
 
In thinking about the possible overall welfare 
improvement for this country as a consequence of 
international fragmentation, note that the new Hicksian 
composite Isoquant is superior to the old. This would be a 
probable consequence of fragmentation if the world price of a 
composite bundle appropriate to assembling I had not 
changed. Such a result follows because of the convexity of the 
original composite Isoquant and the fact that with I a positive 
convex combination of the two fragments, at least one of them 
must lie closer to the origin (than the original composite) by a 
finite amount.
2 Is this enough to guarantee that the country as a 
whole benefits from fragmentation? Yes, if prices of other 
traded goods are not disturbed (as assumed in Figure 2). 
However, in general with a realignment of all traded goods 
prices as a consequence of fragmentation, it might be the case 
that a country's terms of trade could sufficiently worsen so that 
it is made worse off. 
Not considered in Figure 2 is the possibility that 
price falls for both fragments A and B could suffice to make it 
impossible for this country to produce either fragment even if 
initially its production pattern was heavily concentrated in 
commodity I. (That is, the country's endowment ray would 
pass close to point I.) Such a possibility is illustrated in Figure 
3. In Jones and Kierzkowski ( 1998) the analogy is made of 
such a scenario with that of an Olympic gold winner in a 
mixed event, such as the decathlon, who might return with no 
medals if the integrated event were to be broken down into 
separate components. What is revealed is that being an 
effective competitor in an integrated event may result from 
productivity in each of the separate fragments being neither 
very high nor very low, but that potential rivals exist which are 
superior in particular fragments, only to be dragged down by 
                                                 
2
Indeed, even if commodity I originally lies within the 
Hicksian composite unit-value Isoquant (so that I cannot be 
produced by this country), after fragmentation a segment such as 
A’could lie on the new Isoquant.  An exception could be shown in 
Figure 2 if final commodity I was produced (along with the first 
commodity) as well as another commodity, C, and it was 
commodity C that was fragmented instead of commodity I.  It 
might be the case that the fragments at the new world prices would 
lie along the I1 linear segment. 
low productivities in the remaining ones. In school the 
valedictorian may have a uniform A- average in all subjects, 
even though there are one or more others in the class who 
have received A+'s in each of the subjects but have earned 
only C's in others. A finer degree of specialization is possible 
with fragmentation, and this serves to reward those countries 
that are particularly good at producing some fragment, but 
whose superiority is not of such a caliber in others. 
Fragmentation allows a greater scope for application of 
Ricardian comparative advantage. 
 
Must the country which is illustrated in Figure 3 be 
made worse off by fragmentation? The Hicksian unit-value 
Isoquant, which after fragmentation is clearly inferior, does 
not tell the whole story. The country's consumers may be 
heavily biased in their tastes for commodity I, and price falls 
in the components after fragmentation may more than offset 
the welfare effects of moving to the more limited Hicksian 
composite Isoquant. 
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International fragmentation results in a realignment 
of production patterns among countries. Emphasized above is 
the possibility that the technological performance of inputs in 
various countries differs (as would be reflected in different 
Hicksian Isoquant), leading to a Ricardian emphasis on 
technology and comparative advantage. But Heckscher-Ohlin 
elements are also involved. Although Figures 2 and 3 are 
somewhat limited in showing only three commodities 
producible (prior to fragmentation), they suffice to suggest that 
relatively capital abundant countries will produce 
commodities  2 and I and relatively labor abundant countries 
commodities 1 and I. Ricardian comparisons are useful in 
differentiating among the shapes of the Hicksian composite 
Isoquant among countries, and Heckscher-Ohlin distinctions 
about endowment proportions indicate which portions of the IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Hicksian composite are relevant for a country's production. 
Later we shall indicate a role for the specific-factors model in 
the analysis of fragmentation. 
 
We have so far established that a combination of 
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models can be very 
illuminating in explaining the phenomenon of production 
fragmentation and its effects on wages and other factor prices. 
 But it is quite pertinent to ask whether another theoretical 
framework may not be better suited to explain the emergence 
of international production networks.  In particular, imperfect 
competition could possibly provide a more realistic 
description and explanation of international fragmentation.  It 
is possible to build a model of fragmentation based on 
imperfect competition.  Indeed, the paper by Richard Harris in 
this volume does so in an elegant manner. However, it is hard 
to say whether international fragmentation of production is 
driven by imperfect competition per se.  We leave this 
question open hoping for an answer to come out of future 
empirical research and case studies.  Does Nike's reallocation 
of sports shoe production to Malaysia require an imperfect 
competition model or is the old Ricardian Framework 
stressing productivity and wage differences across nations 
powerful enough to explain what is going on?  Similarly, US-
Mexico outsourcing in the textile industry may also be based 
mainly on wage/productivity differentials and a perfect 
competition model seems a reasonable choice in this case.  Of 
course, computer and pharmaceutical industries could hardly 
be assumed to be competitive.  Without in-depth case studies 
the question cannot be unanswered categorically. 
 
As detailed in section 3, although increasing returns 
to scale and imperfect competition may or may not be relevant 
in modeling production blocks they appear to be crucial in 
service links.  For modeling purposes, we will assume the 
existence of only fixed costs in production of services 
connecting various stages of production.  The development of 
the Internet comes close to justifying our assumption.  The 
analysis of other services such as insurance, banking, 
transportation and coordination could rely on a monopolistic 
competition or oligopolistic framework. 
 
 
3. The Role of Services in Fragmentation 
 
In the Uruguay round of talks leading up to the 
creation of the World Trade Organization much attention was 
paid to the possibility of bringing services under the rubric of 
international agreements to liberalize trade. In Jones and 
Kierzkowski (1990) we suggested how integrated production 
processes could be characterized by a series of production 
blocks which are connected by various service links. The 
notion whereby a larger scale of output can result in a finer 
division of labor, promulgated two centuries ago by Adam 
Smith, is essential in our discussion of the role of services 
such as transportation, communication, and co-ordination in 
linking increasingly fragmented production blocks and 
reducing average costs. 
 
We do not deny the importance of service activities 
within a simple production block since inputs have to be 
organized, supervised, and coordinated before production can 
take place. The role of services is further emphasized when 
more than one production block is involved, because these 
blocks must be linked to generate efficient output. It is this 
kind of  service link which we wish to emphasize. We propose 
to accept two stylized facts about the costs of these service 
links: First, purely domestic service links are less costly than 
those required to connect production blocks located in more 
than one country. This could readily be the case for all 
individual services, but here we only assume such a cost 
disparity characterizes aggregate service links. Second, 
production of services displays strong increasing returns to 
scale. Indeed, we would argue that such economies of scale 
are more likely to be found in service activities than within 
production blocks. 
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0 OUTPUT E
TOTAL
COST
C
D
F
S(2)
S*(2)
TC(1)
TC(2)
TC*(2)
 
 
This pair of stylized facts is taken to extremes in our 
subsequent diagrammatic treatment whereby production 
blocks exhibit constant returns to scale (as in Figures 1 - 3) 
and service links involve only constant fixed costs and zero 
variable costs. In Figure 4 ray TC(1) represents total costs 
within a simple production block. Also portrayed are two 
possible cost configurations: TC(2) integrates two domestic 
production blocks, with vertical intercept measuring the 
constant service costs of such integration, whereas TC*(2) 
reflects costs for a production process combining one 
domestic production block with one foreign production block. 
The country assignment is dictated by considerations of 
Ricardian comparative advantage, and/or Heckscher-Ohlin IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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type of matching factor-intensity rankings with relative 
cheapness of factors. Our assumptions are reflected in the 
higher service costs ,OS*(2), associated with fragmentation in 
the international arena and the linearity of the cost functions. 
Also illustrated in Figure 4 is that intersection point D lies to 
the right of intersection point C. This is consistent with the 
following scenario to describe the production process as 
industry output expands from low levels. At first a single 
block is the most efficient way in which to organize 
production.  When scale of output OE is reached, further 
expansion of output entails a switch to (domestically) 
fragmented production with costs given by the TC(2) 
schedule. However, after output level OF is attained, it pays to 
bring a foreign production block into the process; although 
this involves higher costs of the service links, the lower 
marginal costs of production reflected in TC*(2) make this 
route more efficient. An alternative route would entail 
switching to international linkages at an earlier stage, 
dispensing with larger-scale purely domestic operations - this 
would require point D to lie to the left of point C. Not 
illustrated in Figure 4 is an extension of the argument to 
greater levels of output and switches to more production 
blocks perhaps involving several countries and higher costs of 
service links. 
 
This focus on the theory of international 
fragmentation of production fits well with concerns about the 
role of geography in explaining trade patterns.  Indeed, 
international fragmentation of  production is about geography. 
 Our basic premise is that geographic parameters defining a 
firm are not fixed and reduced to a dimensionless point in a 
dimensionless country.  Technological advances reduce 
distance separating different regions, be they home or abroad. 
 With the death of distance, the geographic scope for modeling 
and organizing production processes expands.  This expansion 
may start at home, but when it moves across national borders a 
new type of international trade is created.  Unlike the 
emphasis in the current literature on geography and trade, we 
predict that the death of distance will not only create trade in 
final goods but also trade in parts, components, and producer 
goods. 
 
4. Causes of Fragmentation 
 
In the preceding account of fragmentation we 
assumed that some change takes place "off- stage" to allow 
fragments of a production process to be marketed separately 
whereas previously they had to be integrated with only the 
final product traded on world markets. Technical progress in 
the service sectors is perhaps the most obvious candidate. 
Tales abound of the fantastic reduction in the cost of 
international telephone calls, of  reductions in transport costs 
and the availability of internet connections, of much greater 
ease and lower costs of making banking transactions, all of 
which make coordination of production blocks in various 
locations around the globe feasible.
3 As well, increased 
knowledge of other cultures and laws is important. In 
arranging arms-length transactions between countries it helps 
to know what legal procedures to follow in case the conditions 
of a contract are not met. Assurances of reliability in timing of 
shipments is essential if fragmentation at the global level is to 
be achieved. 
 
We have argued that economies of scale in service 
activities can be quite pronounced. Significant set-up or fixed 
costs coupled with low marginal costs typify many of the 
service links required to support fragmentation. As a 
consequence, sheer growth in economic activity serves to 
induce higher levels of networking on a global basis. 
Furthermore, in many countries there has been a tendency to 
loosen the degree of governmental regulation domestically of 
service activities. In the United States, for example, airline 
deregulation and greater competition in telecommunications 
have altered the costs of business organization. 
 
At the international level the efforts to liberalize 
barriers to service trade can be expected to encourage the 
tendency towards greater fragmentation of economic activity, 
and this for several reasons. If a country can for the first time 
obtain such services from the international market without 
governmental obstruction, costs of service links are obviously 
reduced. But more is involved. Liberalization encourages both 
an increase in scale of activity and an increase in the degree of 
market competition in the service industries. As the 
experience in telecommunications in the United States and 
Europe is revealing, greater competition induces reductions in 
cost. 
 
5. Fragmentation and Income Distribution 
 
International fragmentation of economic activity is a 
phenomenon associated with globalization, and in both the 
United States and Europe fears have been expressed in 
voluble tones as to the unsettling effect on the distribution of 
income of such trends in world production and trade. In 
particular, the criticism is often voiced that for such advanced 
countries globalization poses a threat to unskilled labor, either 
in the form of lower real wages or (especially in Europe) of 
higher levels of unemployment. 
 
Figure 2 can usefully be harnessed to display some of 
the possibilities for income distribution associated with 
fragmentation. Think of the two categories of inputs as an 
amalgam of physical and human capital on the vertical axis 
                                                 
3
Australia has in the past decades produced a series of 
notable films.  It has also been host to the production end of some 
films co-ordinated from Hollywood.  Such fragmentation has 
recently been further encouraged since internet transmissions have 
obviated the need to fly rushes from Australia to California. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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and unskilled labor on the horizontal.  Start by considering the 
situation of a country which is relatively unskilled 
labor-abundant in the specific sense of having an endowment 
ray in Figure 2 passing south-east of point I (and allowing 
production of commodities I and 1). As already discussed, 
fragmentation for a country such as this involves the loss to 
global competition of the labor-intensive fragment, Bc. It is 
just such a loss which prompts observers to fear that 
fragmentation induces a fall in the level of real wages for the 
unskilled, as is apparent from the lower slope of Ac1 
(compared with I1), coupled with the magnification effect 
standard in Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The reasoning, as 
expounded in Jones and Kierzkowski (1998), is that for such a 
country fragmentation is like technical progress in the 
capital-intensive sector of the economy since at initial factor 
prices point A’ represents an improvement over point I. 
 
However reasonable it sounds to suggest that should 
a country lose the labor-intensive fragment of production to 
foreign competition, real wages will suffer, this need not be 
the outcome. Consider the case of a country whose endowment 
ray cuts the chord connecting 2 with Ac  in Figure 2. In such a 
country fragmentation has resulted in an increase in the real 
wage for unskilled workers. Indeed, it is easily seen that the 
level of employment of unskilled workers in the surviving 
capital-intensive fragment, Ac, is even higher than originally 
found in the integrated activity I. Note that compared with the 
previous case considered, it is precisely a relatively 
capital-abundant country that has less to fear from losses of 
labor-intensive fragments to world markets. 
 
Referring once again to Figure 2, the fate of a country 
whose endowment ray lies within a cone defined by rays OA' 
and OI is difficult to reconcile with standard Heckscher-Ohlin 
logic. Such a country initially produces commodities 2 and I, 
and fragmentation that results in the loss of segment Bc  but 
retention of fragment Ac  is akin to technical progress in the 
country's labor-intensive activity. Nonetheless, its real wage 
falls. The problem is that standard Heckscher-Ohlin logic 
applies to small changes in technology, whereas the process of 
fragmentation is definitely not a marginal phenomenon. Figure 
5 (based on the analysis in Findlay and Jones (1998)) helps to 
clarify the issue. The solid locus illustrates the connection 
between endowments and relative factor prices in the initial 
pre-fragmentation state. The economy we are considering has 
endowment proportions shown by point k, with a wage/rent- 
ratio shown by point D, producing commodities 2 and I. The 
dashed locus in Figure 5 reveals that fragmentation of the type 
shown in Figure 2 is like technical progress that has a 
labor-saving bias. (The vertical dashed section labeled Ac  in 
Figure 5 lies to the right of the original stretch labeled I, since 
activity Ac  in Figure 2 is capital-intensive relative to I.)   For 
marginal changes it is standard in trade theory to argue that 
bias does not matter. But clearly in Figure 5 this is no longer 
the case for finite changes, of the type expected with 
fragmentation. The shift is from point D in Figure 5 to point E. 
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The example illustrated above, wherein the loss of a 
labor-intensive segment results in a drop in unskilled wages 
only for relatively labor-abundant countries, does not 
generalize to all cases. (Several others are discussed in Jones 
and Kierzkowski (1998)).  For example, in Figure 3 a 
relatively capital abundant country, producing commodities 2 
and I, would suffer a loss in the real wage of unskilled workers 
with fragmentation, but workers in more labor-abundant 
countries would gain. The purpose of the argument here is not 
to dispute the wisdom of the observation that losses of 
labor-intensive activities to other countries in trade spells 
trouble for unskilled labor, but to suggest that this is not 
always the case. The issue of the effects of international 
fragmentation on the distribution of income is more subtle 
than popular discourse suggests. 
 
As a final exercise we utilize Figures 6 and 7 to 
discuss the possible effects of fragmentation when two 
countries share the same technology.
4 In both diagrams the 
relatively labor-abundant country initially produces 
commodities  1 and I, with its wage/rental ratio shown by the 
slope of the chord connecting Isoquant corners I and 1, while 
the relatively capital-abundant country produces 2 and I at a 
higher wage/rental ratio.  The capital-abundant country 
initially produces I as a convex combination of (non-traded) 
fragments  Ac  and  B, whereas the labor-abundant country 
produces  I facing relatively lower wage rates with fragments A 
and  Bc.  In addition, in Figure 6 each country produces a 
number of other commodities, with world prices reflective of 
that country’s factor-price ratio as well as the commonly-
shared technology.  After fragmentation each country produces 
                                                 
4 This is the focus of the related paper by Alan Deardorff 
(1998), to whom we are indebted for stimulating conversations on 
this topic. 
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one segment of the vertical process for producing I:  Ac  in the 
capital-abundant country and Bc in the labor-abundant country, 
assuming factor prices remain undisturbed in each country.  
The cost saving involved for these fragmented economies is, 
in relative terms, shown by IIc/0I.  Note that the wider the 
“fragmentation cone”, CF, the greater will be this savings in 
cost as fragmentation takes advantage of the factor-price 
discrepancy between countries. 
 
Figure 6
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In Figure 7 we return to our original setting in which 
many countries are involved in the fragmentation process.  If 
world prices for the fragments yield unit-value Isoquant at Ac 
and Bc, the cost of producing the final product is lowered 
(point I is no longer an option) and the new Hicksian 
composite unit-value Isoquant, shared by both countries, is the 
dashed broken line 2AcBc1.  Has fragmentation caused factor 
prices to converge or to move further apart?  This depends 
upon the extent of dissimilarity in factor endowment 
proportions in the two countries.  If this is wide (e.g. points D 
and  F defining a “factor-endowment cone”, not drawn), 
relative wages become higher in the high-wage country and 
lower in the low-wage country.  On the other hand, a factor 
endowment cone defined, say, by points Dc and Fc ,which is 
contained in the fragmentation cone for techniques, CF, would 
result in fragmentation causing each country to produce both 
segments and their factor prices to be driven to equality.  In 
the event that competition in world markets pushes prices of 
fragments even lower (say to Acc and Bcc), a wide endowment 
cone (defined by rays 0D and 0F) would bring factor prices 
closer together but not all the way to equality.  The 
economist’s favorite phrase, “almost anything can happen” 
seems appropriate for the income-distribution fall-out of 
fragmentation.  This implies, however, that the loss of a labor-
intensive segment due to the process of fragmentation need 
not necessarily harm the interests of labor.  
Figure 7
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Wage rate behavior is sometimes analyzed in a 
context of the specific-factors model (e.g. as in Jones and 
Engerman, 1996).  For example, if unskilled labor is mobile 
among sectors (with physical capital and skilled labor the 
specific factors), technological change in any sector will tend 
to spill over to register benefits to unskilled labor unless 
progress has a significant labor-saving bias.  The point we 
wish to stress here is that the Hicksian unit-value Isoquant 
apparatus utilized in Figures 2 and 3 need not be restricted to 
the standard all-factors-mobile Heckscher-Ohlin scenario.   
Instead, suppose that productive activity takes place in many 
sectors of the economy, and in each there is a specific type of 
physical or human capital employed, fixed in amount.   
However, suppose that within each such sector there are a 
number of industries which employ the type of specific capital 
identified with that sector.  Then the analysis of fragmentation 
in some such industry can build upon the type of Hicksian 
unit-value-Isoquant displayed in Figures 2 or 3. The major 
alteration is that the quantity of unskilled labor employed by 
that sector becomes endogenous.
5 
 
6.  Consequences of Fragmentation: Concluding 
Remarks 
 
The role of services has been highlighted in our 
discussion but not whether services themselves become 
internationally tradeable and subject to fragmentation.  Thus 
production blocks could be fragmented internationally by 
making use of fairly integrated non-traded national service 
links, such as banking or accounting services.  However, 
much of the current change in technology has allowed 
                                                 
5 For an analysis of this type see Jones and Marjit 
(1992). 
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fragmentation in international service links.  Providers of 
service activities in transportation and communication have 
made frequent use of locations in the Caribbean, say, to 
provide answers to queries about hotels, airline possibilities 
and telephone numbers from sources worldwide.  A 
flourishing software sector has emerged in Bangalore to 
design new packages and trouble-shoot difficulties and 
problems posed to them by firms in the United States, Western 
Europe and elsewhere.  Indeed, given the existence of different 
time zones, there is an advantage in being able to pose the 
query at the end of the day in Pacific Coast Time and have an 
answer ready at the start of work the next morning! 
 
One major consequence of the process of 
fragmentation into more simple production blocks is that new 
firms can spring up to take over some such blocks and to 
supply a number of other (competing) firms with its output.  
Thus further economies of scale are generated and demand for 
the block can exhibit greater stability than would be the case if 
separate firms all performed identical processes.   
 
       "Since the mid-1980's, and particularly in the 1990's, 
large and well-known American electronics companies such 
as Apple, IBM, NCR, Philips, ATT, Hewlett Packard, and 
DEC have been abandoning their internal manufacturing 
operations in droves and turning to contract manufacturers 
such as SCI to build their products.  At the same time, many 
younger, faster growing electronics firms, many of them based 
in Silicon Valley, CA, have always used contract 
manufacturers; few new firms have built internal 
manufacturing capacity even as they have grown (e.g. Sun 
Microsystems, Silicon Graphics, and Cisco Systems)." 
(Sturgeon, 1997). 
 
Think of how wasteful it would be if each separate 
firm were to install its own e-mail apparatus or fax system in 
order to connect its own production blocks. 
 
International fragmentation of vertical production 
processes into separate production blocks often results in 
these blocks being sufficiently simple that they find potential 
uses in other activities seemingly remote from the original 
final product.  Thus computer chips are used not only in 
computers, but also in cars, micro-vans, cameras, etc.  In 
addition it is now easier and more convenient for consumers to 
obtain what can only be described as custom-made final 
products without the cost of hands-on treatment at a traditional 
retail outlet.  For example, Levi-Strauss allows customers to 
order jeans tailored to individual measurements "at the click of 
a mouse" (Cairncross, 1997).  Dell Computers allows 
customers to skip the retail outlet and to use the Internet to 
order a computer with a great number of individually specified 
parameters and to expect this customized product to be 
delivered in a matter of days (Davis and Meyer, 1998).  Dell 
passes on the order to a number of separate (mainly foreign) 
sub-contractors.  Such fragmentation would have appeared 
totally strange to the IBM of the 1960's, intent on providing 
completely integrated products in-house. 
 
Examples of fragmentation need not be limited to the 
computer industry.  Nike, for example, has found that its 
comparative advantage lies in design and marketing, leaving 
unto others all the manufacturing.  The famous camera, Leica, 
has its lenses produced in Germany, and its body and electrical 
parts produced in Spain, Canada, and the Far East.  
 
In our earlier discussion of fragmentation (Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 1990) we pondered the role of multinationals.  
We stated that international fragmentation was taking place 
both within multinational organizations and by means of arms-
length arrangements in the market.  Here we suggest an update 
with a bias.  As the price of international service links 
declines, and as knowledge of potential international suppliers 
and legal systems becomes more widespread, we now suggest 
that the necessity for containing various production blocks 
under the umbrella of a multinational organization is 
systematically being reduced. But we leave unto others the 
task of testing the proposition that there is an increasing role 
to be played by separate firms (perhaps smaller than in the 
past) connected only by the rules of the international market 
place.    
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